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This article describes to what extent EU merger control practice takes into
account the speciﬁcities of different sectors when assessing innovation
effects, in the context of applying remedies. The pharmaceutical, ICT and
telecom sectors are exempliﬁed via a number of inﬂuential cases. It will be
stated to what extent innovation goals are similar across sectors and why it
should be sufﬁciently evaluated whether such goals will be accomplished
by a certain merger control decision.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The European Commission and innovation
1.1.1. Innovation and competition law
In recent years, it has been researched to what extent innovation is a goal of com-
petition law. As regards the EU, the nexus between competition and innovation has
been speciﬁcally described in the ﬁeld of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and
Article 101 and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.1 The Technology Transfer
Block Exemption Regulation and the Technology Transfer Guidelines seem con-
cerned with creating an innovative environment.2 Moreover, the EU Commission
and Courts have tried to stimulate innovation by providing, under exceptional
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
*Email: f.kartner@jur.ru.nl; faykartner@gmail.com
†A shortened version of this article, in Dutch, has been published in Actioma, journal of the
Faculty of Law of Radboud University (issue 198, November 2016, pp. 12–19).
1Benjamin Mooij and Catalin S. Rusu, ‘Innovation and EU Competition Law: In Need of a
Narrative for where the Money is Put’ (2016) 43 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 173–
200, 178–9.
2Allowing for temporary restrictions of passive sales in an exclusive territory, prohibiting of
compulsory grant-back of severable improvements to licenced technology, and prohibiting
on clauses that restrict R&D and exploitation of technology. See also Mooij and Rusu (n 1)
184 ff; it is mentioned that State aid and merger control fall outside the scope of this
publication.
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circumstances, for compulsory licencing of IPRs, in order for competitors to build
further upon this knowledge.3 Thus, in recent years, these institutions have become
more aware of the effects of their decisions on technological development. The
above-mentioned aspects of the practice of the Courts and Commission are now
well known; however, it has not yet been sufﬁciently researched to what extent
the approaches in other ﬁelds of EU economic law are in line with these ﬁndings.
1.1.2. Innovation and merger control
A ﬁeld for which it is not clear yet towhat extent it contributes to innovation, ismerger
control. There is still not enough transparency on why the remedies applied would be
optimal for competition and for innovation.4 Remedies can be too restrictive on con-
tract freedom, or, on the other hand, not protect competition enough – both restricting
innovation. The hypothesis is that it is still not sufﬁciently explained how innovation
effects are taken into account. What speciﬁcally needs to be researched more, is how
approaches can differ per sector.5 A concentration can remove incentives to innovate
for the merging parties – for example, two pharmaceutical companies working on
competingmedicines.Amerger can then lead to one type ofmedicine not being devel-
oped anymore. This is something the Commission wants to prevent; a remedy can be
selling off a particular part of the business.6 In the ICTsector, the analysis focusesmore
onothercompanies’ incentives to innovate.Here, theCommission looks at themerged
ﬁrm’s ability to foreclose competitors.7 Speciﬁc concerns arise in areas such as the
Internet, where it is easy for consumers to switch to a competing service. The net neu-
trality debate is an example of this.8 The sectors thus seem to need differentiation.
3For example, Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91 P Magill [1995] ECR I-00743, ECLI:
EU:C:1995:98; Case C-7/97 Bronner [1998] ECR I-07791, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569; Case
C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] ECR I-05039, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257; Case T-201/04 Micro-
soft [2007] ECR II-03601, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. See also Josef Drexl (ed.), Research
Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2008).
4See, for example, Dorte Hoeg, European Merger Remedies (Hart 2013) 186 ff.
5For a general explanation of why competition law can adopt differentiated approaches per
sector, see Mark A. Lemley, ‘Industry-speciﬁc Antitrust Policy for Innovation’ [2012]
Columbia Business Law Review 637–53.
6Commission, DG Competition,Merger Control and Innovation, Competition Policy Brief,
April 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf
accessed 1 October 2016. See, for example, Medtronic/Covidien (Case COMP/M.7326)
[2015] OJ C82/01; Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline (Case COMP/M.7275) [2015] OJ C95/14;
Pﬁzer/Hospira (Case COMP/M.7559) [2015] OJ C/324/03.
7Commission, DG Competition,Merger Control and Innovation, Competition Policy Brief,
April 2016 5–6. For example, Intel/McAfee (Case COMP/M.5984) [2011] OJ C98/11;
ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto JV (Case COMP/M.6564) [2012] OJ C368/9; Telefó-
nica UK/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere JV (Case COMP/M.6314) [2013] OJ C66/5;
Intel/Altera (Case COMP/M.7688) [2015] OJ C408/2.
8On these and similar issues, see for example: Katerina Maniadaki, EU Competition Law,
Regulation and the Internet: The Case of Net Neutrality (Kluwer Law International 2015).
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1.2. Merger remedies and innovation
1.2.1. Interoperability
There are multiple ways in which mergers in innovative markets can lead to com-
petition concerns. Therefore, the Commission often tries to resolve these concerns
by only accepting a concentration when remedies are put in place. A sufﬁcient
extent of interoperability can be a solution, for example. Interoperability means:
“the ability to exchange and use information”, which is not an absolute ability,
but a matter of degree.9 Merging parties often have to ensure that their future pro-
ducts will still work well together with those of competitors, because otherwise,
the merger will not be cleared. The competitors will then not be driven out of
the market; demand for their products will not decline for this reason. A commit-
ment to provide interoperability information can thus be beneﬁcial to competition,
since it can facilitate new entrants or improve sales of competing products.
Although not as intrusive as having to divest a certain product business, these
interoperability remedies impact heavily on a ﬁrm’s contract freedom. That is
why they have attracted critical remarks as well. According to Hoehn and
Lewis, ﬁrms are in this way subject to regulatory oversight for a longer period
of time. Such behavioural commitments are given for the long term, and it has
to be monitored whether they are complied with, so measures of this kind are
even said to be “quasi-structural”.10
1.2.2. Intellectual property issues regarding interoperability remedies
Interoperability standards and protocols are frequently based on IPRs. Often, IPRs
owned by the notifying parties have to be licenced before rival products can sufﬁ-
ciently work together with those of the merged entity. Other possible solutions are:
divestment of intellectual property (IP) to an independent body, or a commitment to
implement a certain protocol on existing and/or future products (see, e.g. the Cisco/
Tandberg case). IP can be licenced on a royalty-free basis or for a royalty payment.
Often, licences have to be granted on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”
terms. Despite elaborate discussions in the literature, it is still not entirely clear
what this means, leading to legal uncertainty.11 Merger remedies of this type thus
have to be examined with care, taking into account the speciﬁcities of each case.
1.3. Structure of the article
This article will evaluate whether the differences between sectors are sufﬁciently
taken into account by the Commission when assessing merger remedies. The
9Thomas Hoehn and Alex Lewis, ‘Interoperability Remedies and Innovation: A Review of
Recent Case Law’, 3 https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/business-school/Public/IP-Research-
Centre/Interoperability%20remedies%20and%20innovation-%20a%20review%20of%20
recent%20case%20law.pdf accessed 1 October 2016.
10Hoehn and Lewis (n 9).
11Ibid.
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following research question will be answered: “To what extent does EU merger
control practice take into account the speciﬁcities of different sectors when asses-
sing innovation effects, in the context of applying remedies?” In paragraph 2, a
general overview is given on the possible effects of mergers on innovation. In
the third paragraph, it is explained which approach the EU Commission and
Courts generally take when assessing innovation effects of merger remedies. In
paragraph 4, the pharmaceutical, ICT and telecom sectors (as a network industry)
are exempliﬁed via a number of inﬂuential cases. Lemley has already described
why competition law should differentiate between sectors when trying to foster
innovation; this article will test this theory for the EU Commission’s practice.12
Paragraph 5 compares, and explains the differences between sectors. The con-
clusion states to what extent innovation goals in these different areas are linked
and why it should be sufﬁciently evaluated whether such goals will be accom-
plished by a certain merger control decision.
2. The connection between mergers and innovation
2.1. Effects of innovation on competition
2.1.1. The relevance of innovation for merger analysis
The innovativeness of a market can be relevant for merger analysis in various
manners. A merger can provide a ﬁrm with a combination of assets that allow it
to come up with a new product ﬁrst. This is an effect on “competition in inno-
vation”. Innovations can comprise markets in themselves – an improvement of
a certain product may result in a new market. The merged entity’s technology is
thus relevant when deﬁning the market, but it also needs to be taken into
account when assessing its market power. Access to an important technology
increases a ﬁrm’s bargaining power. However, if there is much product innovation
in a given market, then even a company with a high market share in the current
generation of products may not be considered dominant.13
2.1.2. When does a merger impede competition?
It is important to look whether there is competition in the market, or for the market.
Competition for the market means that there is mostly a near-monopoly, but over
the years, different (sometimes newly established) ﬁrms enjoy this position. The
structure of the market then “changes radically”. If the market will probably
change radically in the short to medium term, a merger is not likely to harm con-
sumer welfare. It can be problematic, though, when the merger itself alters the con-
ditions of competition and makes entry more difﬁcult. In Philips/Agilent Health
12Lemley (n 5).
13Alistair Lindsay and Alison Berridge, The EU Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues
(Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 265–7.
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Care Solutions,14 the Commission explained that innovation was needed for a
strong market position, and that market positions were not stable. In Hoffmann-
La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim,15 the Commission came to a similar conclusion.
If one of the merging parties is not yet active in a certain market, but is developing
a new technology, a merger may signiﬁcantly impede effective competition – since
an important potential competitor may disappear.16 The effects of mergers on
innovation can thus vary signiﬁcantly. Therefore, it is necessary to identify differ-
ent types of cases in which they play a role.
2.2. Different types of transactions in innovative markets
2.2.1. Incumbent ﬁrms, new entrants, current and future markets
To better understand the effects of mergers in innovative markets, they can be
divided into categories, for example those described by Glader. One category com-
prises transactions between actors already active on a concentrated product/tech-
nology market where innovation is an important means of competition. A second
category of cases relates to transactions between incumbent ﬁrms and potential
new entrants. Successful innovation is often needed for entry. A third scenario is
competition for future product markets. There are a number of alternative research
and development (R&D) routes that can result in a particular product or technology.
Possibly, there is currently no close substitute for the product or process that is being
created. R&D can result in a completely new product, or a “new generation” product
which renders the current version obsolete, for a large part.17
2.2.2. New technologies which could belong to different markets
Apart from the previous, there are upstream R&D transactions which can create
various new technologies and products, which could belong to different down-
stream markets. Such situations are rather complex to assess, because it is difﬁcult
to deﬁne the exact downstream market and its characteristics – at least at the time
that the Commission is involved. In these cases, the merging ﬁrms often have a
combination of R&D assets that are crucial for the development of various
markets. IPRs are thus important for the Commission to keep in mind. Important
IPR combinations may fall in the same hands after a merger (the same can happen
in patent pools, which will not be considered in this article).18
14Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions (Case COMP/M.2256) [2001] OJ C292/05.
15Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim (Case IV/M.950) Commission Decision 98/
526/EC [1998] OJ L234/14.
16Lindsay and Berridge (n 13) 265–7.
17Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition Law and
US Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2006), 92.
18Glader (n 17) 92. Patent pools are groups of ﬁrms which bring together their patents in
order use them jointly, to gain a combination of knowledge which is positive for innovation.
302 F. Kartner
Innovation, R&D and IPRs can thus affect the analysis of a concentration in
different ways.
3. The Commission’s general approach to mergers and innovation
3.1. The Commission’s test
3.1.1. Merger guidelines
Having looked at the ways in which mergers can affect innovation, we will now
see how the European Commission deals with such situations. It is mostly difﬁcult
to predict how technology (and thus the market) will develop. Usually, a certain
“critical mass” of R&D and investment is needed to successfully launch a new
technology – a process which may take much time. However, once this process
is successful, innovation leads to better ﬁnance and vice versa. The fact that the
Commission needs to look at (still ongoing) R&D processes, entails legal difﬁcul-
ties. After all, before R&D is completed, it is not possible to tell with certainty
what its effects will be on the market – will it be a success or not?19
Nevertheless, there are a number of guiding principles. The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines20 explain the way in which the Commission assesses concentrations. It
looks at innovation when deﬁning the relevant market, when describing the struc-
ture of the market, and when looking at barriers to entry. Both past and (possible)
future innovations are relevant. When substantial investments in R&D are needed,
this is viewed as a barrier to entry. On the other hand, offering an innovative
product can be a way to enter into a market. The Commission looks at the
extent to which the industry is concentrated, the level of specialization, the way
the industry is developing globally, economies of scale/scope and IP portfolios.
Even a ﬁrm with a high market share is less likely to be dominant when it has
(many) competitors with very active R&D divisions. The Commission is primarily
interested in the market leader and its closest competitor (or the most qualitative or
innovative one) and according to Laskowska, this is a good starting point, but the
Commission does not examine companies’ R&D strength in a sufﬁcient manner:
its argumentation is too general and “insufﬁciently supported by elements of
proof”.21 In many situations, the Commission does not clearly investigate the
speciﬁc circumstances of each case and the speciﬁc effects on the competitors con-
cerned. Instead, it only looks at what is likely in theory, while actual market cir-
cumstances might be different.22
These will not be considered in this article, because they do not fall within the deﬁnition of
‘concentration’, and will thus not be scrutinized ex ante by the Commission.
19Magdalena Laskowska, ‘A Global View of Innovation Analysis in European Merger
Control’ (2013) 2–4, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2337174 2–4, accessed 1 October 2016.
20Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C31/5.
21Laskowska (n 19) 2–4.
22Ibid.
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3.1.2. Strong points in the Commission’s analysis
However this criticism seems justiﬁed, the Commission’s analyses contain many
sound patterns of reasoning. When competition between leading ﬁrms declines
because they show less innovation, this does not necessarily mean that there is
less competition between leading innovators, since these might be different
ﬁrms. Firms may show different types of innovation: one ﬁrm can focus on
improving quality, while another prefers to enhance its advertising. This does
not matter, as there is still competition causing innovation.23 The Commission
does ﬁnd it problematic when merging ﬁrms carry out activities or own assets
which are to a large extent complementary. If the new entity has a large amount
of market power, this ﬁrm can for example refuse to licence its technology to
competitors.24
The Commission is especially concerned when important structural links
between ﬁrms are created, for example when they divide IPRs strategically.
When certain crucial patents are brought together in a single ﬁrm, this can lead
to a dominant position. However, the parties can claim that efﬁciencies arising
from the merger outweigh the drawbacks. The Commission is likely to approve
the merger when innovation will still be important for competition, when there
will still be enough actual and potential competitors, and when the acquired
ﬁrm is currently not the acquiring ﬁrm’s most important competitor with regard
to R&D. When a merged ﬁrm has large ﬁnancial resources, it is easier for this
ﬁrm to be innovative, since it can more easily take the risk that a new product
might fail, or use these ﬁnancial means for research. It may be harmful,
however, when competitors as a reaction limit their R&D activities or leave the
market entirely.25
3.1.3. Difﬁculties in the Commission’s analysis
Mergers of R&D-intensive companies can thus lead to synergies, economies of
scale, and improved R&D for the merged ﬁrm, but they may also give rise to com-
petition concerns. According to Laskowska, the Commission “does not clearly
show concrete harm to innovation”26 in such cases. The Commission often
merely assumes that the combination of two important innovators will have a
negative impact on R&D, and that competitors will not sufﬁciently countervail
this strong position.27 In some cases, it discusses a very wide variety of factors,
while in other cases only one or two are given attention. There are no clear expla-
nations for this. In some cases, the Commission takes into account overlaps with
23Ibid 5.
24Ibid 6.
25Ibid 7.
26Ibid 8.
27Ibid.
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other markets because there could be synergies, but in other cases it does not,
again without a clear explanation. The dynamic character of many markets is
taken into account, however, according to Laskowska, again in an unsystematic
way.28 In her opinion:
[…] analysis of harm to long-term competition is generally not an examination of
potential harm but rather a statement.29
[…] leading innovation cases have not been identiﬁed, and
[…] the Commission disregarded basic economic insights in some cases, and incon-
sistent and perfunctory treatment of innovation concerns is not rare.30
Thus, the Commission certainly shows awareness of the importance of innovation,
but it has also received criticism for not being clear and consistent enough.
Other cases show the difﬁculties of assessing precise effects as well. In UTC/
Goodrich,31 the Commission concluded that the concentration would lead to a
near-monopoly on one of the relevant markets, and looked whether the merged
entity’s incentives to conduct R&D would be diminished.32 In such cases, it
does not have to be proven directly that innovation has suffered. When a rival
ﬁrm is excluded from the market, or when a near-monopoly is created that is
likely to last for a long time, this already means that competitors have fewer incen-
tives to innovate,33 and Ibáñez Colomo states that in this sense:
[…] the assessment of the effects of a merger between pharmaceutical companies
[…] is not fundamentally different from the acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair.34
This seems to imply that sectoral differences do not have a major role here. It is,
however, debatable whether this statement is always correct, since very different
interests are at stake. The threshold might be met more easily in one sector than in
another.
3.1.4. Will competitors be excluded?
It is important to remain careful. When a merger would give a competitive advan-
tage to the merged entity, this is in itself not a sufﬁcient reason for the Commission
to take measures. After all, when a ﬁrm has a strong position on the market, this
28Ibid 9.
29Ibid 10.
30Ibid 11.
31UTC/Goodrich (Case COMP/M.6410) [2015] OJ C388/7.
32P. Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Restrictions on Innovation in EU Competition Law’ [2016] 8
European Law Review, lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2015-22_Colomo.pdf 8,
accessed 1 October 2016.
33Ibid 9.
34Ibid.
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can mean different things for competition. It can give other ﬁrms an incentive to be
equally innovative – on the other hand, it can cause them to leave the market.
When the merged entity’s position is merely strengthened, without a near-mon-
opoly being established, the Commission additionally has to show that this
entity will not face sufﬁcient competitive constraints after the merger. A more
problematic situation can arise when the merger speciﬁcally enables the
merged ﬁrm to come up with a new product. This ﬁrst-mover advantage will
however only signiﬁcantly impede effective competition when the large
amount of market power involved is likely to last for a longer time.35 Admittedly,
this is difﬁcult to predict. That is why it is very important for the Commission to
make use of the most recent economic theories on innovative markets. In this
way, it can best assess whether a merger will still allow competitors to do
their best to come up with new products, or whether the merged ﬁrm will
have such an important combination of assets that it can exclude others from
the market. Viewpoints for this are developing in case law, as we will see in
the following paragraphs.
3.2. The Commission’s solutions
3.2.1. Interoperability remedies
Despite the complexities of assessing the precise effects of mergers, there is a
diversity of solutions to their possible negative effects on competition. Both
behavioural and structural remedies are important. The Commission has much
ﬂexibility in determining how long commitments should last. Commitments that
are shorter in duration allow for more adequate reactions to fast developments
in the market; long-lasting commitments are a heavy burden on ﬁrms and are
often not even necessary, according to Hoehn and Lewis. When there is a
long-term interoperability remedy, this could limit the merged entity’s return on
investment. For competitors, incentives to invest and innovate may be reduced
as well. They can continue selling the products at issue, so they will not be inclined
to develop innovative technologies of their own.36
3.2.2. Criticism on interoperability remedies
Hoehn and Lewis are also very critical regarding the practice of appointing a
Monitoring Trustee to ensure that commitments are complied with. After all,
this is a very intrusive measure. When a company is monitored in this way, it
could make different decisions. For example: to alter a product, to stop developing
or delivering a certain product, or not to introduce a new/next generation product.
So, this scrutiny, indirectly by the Commission, can have a negative impact on
35Lindsay and Berridge (n 13) 262.
36Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004
and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 [2008] OJ C 267/1.
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innovation.37 Having to licence on royalty-free terms can remove incentives to
invest for a merged ﬁrm, but on the other hand, competition can increase if the
beneﬁciary could previously not gain access to the market.38 There are thus,
again, dilemmas to be dealt with.
The Commission thus makes use of various economic insights in order to
assess the innovation effects of mergers, however, it still faces difﬁculties in apply-
ing a case-by-case approach.
4. Commission practice
4.1. Early decisions on mergers and efﬁciency
4.1.1. Problems with the Commission’s reasoning
When analysing the criticism on the Commission’s merger practice, we can
see to what extent it is appropriate, why shortcomings have come into
being, and whether the Commission is succeeding in improving it. In
order to do this, the Commission practice will be placed into a historical
perspective.
A number of early cases show lines of reasoning that are not entirely convin-
cing. In Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz,39 the Commission explains that the R&D divisions
of the companies concerned are large, causing synergies and other important
advantages which competitors do not have. In Shell/Montecatini,40 the merging
parties argue that the market is developing quickly and new ﬁrms are likely to
enter. The Commission only explains that R&D processes usually take long in
this sector and that it is uncertain whether new parties will show up – it does
not further specify its reasoning for the concrete case. In Procter & Gamble/
VP Schickedanz,41 a number of ﬁrms could potentially enter the market, but
the Commission pointed out that it was unlikely that they would do so in
time. In Tetra Laval/Sidel,42 some competitors were the merged ﬁrm’s equals
in quality and innovation, but did not have such an extensive product line. The
Commission did not indicate which differences in circumstances would inﬂuence
its assessment.43 So, these early cases show that economic circumstances were
not dealt with in a consistent manner.
37Hoehn and Lewis (n 9) 10. In Intel/McAfee, a commitment to provide interoperability
information was made for a speciﬁc term, as usually. In GE/Instrumentarium, an unlimited
term was given for licencing obligations.
38Hoehn and Lewis (n 9) 12.
39Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz (Case IV/M.737) Commission Decision 97/469/EC [1997] OJ L201/1.
40Shell/Montecatini (Case IV/M.269) Commission Decision 96/648/EC [1994] OJ L294/
10.
41Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz (Case IV/M.430) Commission Decision 94/893/EC
[1994] OJ L354/32.
42Tetra Laval/Sidel (Case COMP/M.2416) [2003] OJ.
43Laskowska (n 19) 12–14.
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4.1.2. Scope for improvement
So, how could it do better? First, some general remarks need to be made about
innovative markets. Fatur’s analysis shows some characteristics of the ICT
sector. Merger control should be based on the same principles as in other
sectors, but some aspects have to receive more emphasis than in traditional
sectors. Concerns about innovation and its effects on the competitive process
are more important – as is the case in some other sectors. While this is very difﬁ-
cult, predictions of how the market and technologies will develop must be as rea-
listic as possible, in order to prevent both Type I and Type II errors.44 There are
often IPRs involved, adding questions on the scope and validity of these rights.
The above-discussed examples of (compulsory) licencing can indeed be beneﬁcial
to competition – a competitor will be able to operate more effectively on the
market.45 As has been stated, it is important to determine whether there is compe-
tition in the market or for the market, and whether new products and product func-
tionalities are means of competition. Economies of scale and network effects
(caused by a concentration) can lead to ﬁrst-mover advantages, possibly resulting
in anti-competitive foreclosure. It is, however, important to keep in mind that a
merger usually also enhances the innovative capacities of the merged entity.46
The following paragraphs will discuss a number of examples showing that the
Commission is making progress in better taking into account the speciﬁc circum-
stances of concentrations in technological sectors. However, it will also be pointed
out that there is still room for improvement.
4.2. Recent developments – telecom sector
4.2.1. Hutchison/Telefónica UK
When looking at some recent cases, we see that there is still much room for
improvement. Nevertheless, the Commission seems to have developed more con-
vincing lines of reasoning, for example with regard to the proposed Hutchison/
Telefónica UK concentration. Not every provider has its own network, so some
(so-called “virtual providers”) have to use another ﬁrm’s network to offer their
services. As a result of the takeover, there would have been fewer mobile
network operators willing to host virtual providers – weakening the negotiating
positions of the latter. The merged entity would have been part of both network
sharing arrangements, Mobile Broadband Network Ltd and Beacon, that are
currently there in the UK. The merged entity would know everything about its
competitor’s network arrangements. The Commission feared that this would
have negative effects on innovation in mobile infrastructure, for example new
44AType I error occurs when a merger is blocked which would not be anti-competitive. A
Type II error occurs when a merger is allowed which is anti-competitive.
45Andrej Fatur, EU Competition Law and the Information and Communication Technology
Network Industries (Hart 2011) 217.
46Fatur (n 45) 218.
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technology such as 5G. Hutchison offered remedies, which however did not
resolve the concerns. A remedy was proposed to host one or two virtual operators
on the merged entity’s network. However, even then, mobile virtual operators
would have been “commercially and technically dependent” on the merged
entity. A promise was made to give virtual operators access to 4G and future tech-
nologies. The Commission however concluded that this would not prevent the
expected adverse effects; this is why it decided not to allow the transaction.47
4.2.2. Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann
In Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann,48 the Commission referred to a future market:
“the provision of advanced seamless pan-European mobile telecommunications
services”. Even though such services could not be provided yet for technical
reasons, there was consumer demand. The merged entity, the Commission con-
cluded, would be the only company that could provide these services in the
short to medium term. This could incentivise it to refuse access to its network
to rivals.49 Nevertheless, the concentration was approved, since the merging
ﬁrms’ intention was to give third parties non-discriminatory access to the
network. Similar cases in new markets caused concerns as well, but these have
mostly been solved via commitments.50 In other cases, the Commission referred
to the evolving nature of the market as well; for example in the medical cases
GE/Instrumentarium51 and Bertelsmann/Burda/Springer-HOS-MM;52 and the uti-
lities case TXU Europe/EDF-London Investments.53
4.2.3. Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica Ireland, Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus
In horizontal cases, increasingly use is made of use of behavioural remedies, such
as access to infrastructure. This is exempliﬁed by the Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica
Ireland54 and Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus55 cases. According to Cook, Frisch
47Hutchison/Telefónica UK (Case COMP/M.7612) [2016] OJ C357/08. Commission press
release on this case: europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1704_en.htm.
48Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann (Case COMP/M.1795).
49Lindsay and Berridge (n 13) 262–4.
50See, for example: Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal+ (Case COMP/JV.48); Vivendi/Canal
+/Seagram (Case COMP/M.2050) [2000] OJ C311/3; AOL/TimeWarner (Case COMP/
M.1845) Commission Decision 2001/718/EC [2001] OJ L268/28; BskyB/KirchPayTV
(Case COMP/JV.37); DaimlerChrysler/Deutsche Telekom JV (Case COMP/M.2903) Com-
mission Decision 2003/792/EC [2003] OJ L300/62.
51GE/Instrumentarium (Case COMP/M.3083) Commission Decision 2004/322/EC [2004]
OJ L109/1.
52Bertelsmann/Burda/Springer-HOS-MM (Case IV/M.972) [1997] OJ C360/8.
53Case COMP/JV.36, TXU Europe/EDF-London Investments, 3 February 2000. See
Lindsay and Berridge (n 13). Lindsay and Berridge (n 13) 262–4.
54Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica Ireland (Case COMP/M.6992) [2014] OJ C264.
55Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus (Case COMP/M.7018) [2015] OJ C68/10.
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and Novak, this is a “subtle reﬁnement of the Commission’s previous approach”.
The Commission’s approach in earlier years was to let network-owning companies
offer access via a pay-as-you-go model. In these more recent cases, new entrants
had to make up-front payments for access to a dedicated “pipe” for voice and data
trafﬁc from the network. The reason behind this is to stimulate the new entrant to
make optimal use of the network capacity that it acquires.56
4.2.4. Liberty Global/Ziggo
A case in which innovation is directly addressed, is Liberty Global/Ziggo.57 It deals
with the only two linear premium pay TV ﬁlm channels in the Netherlands (Film1
and HBO). A concern was that the merged entity could charge too high wholesale
prices to other pay TVoperators, or even refuse to supply them certain channels. The
main innovation problem, however, lies with the increased market power of the
merged entity vis-à-vis TV broadcasters. According to the Commission, this
could hamper the development of audio-visual over-the-top (OTT) services (the
delivery of audio, video and other media over the Internet instead of the service pro-
vider’s network). These services compete with traditional pay TV services. The
merged entity could decide to supply certain channels, or give access to its
network, onlywhen the other party promises to limit its OTTactivities. Broadcasters
had already signed agreements which limited their possibilities to offer such OTT
services. These risks were again tackled via commitments, including the divestiture
of Film1. Most importantly, the merged entity will not contractually limit its rivals’
OTTactivities anymore, at least during 8 years. Apart from this, it has to maintain an
adequate interconnection capacity through at least three uncongested routes into its
Internet network in the Netherlands.58 The Commission thus attaches great impor-
tance to a sufﬁcient level of access to a network. In this way, it tries to prevent that
companies owning a network exclude new entrants from the market. It is important,
however that it also keeps in mind that the network-owning companies should have
enough incentives to invest and innovate as well.
4.3. Cases in the ICT sector
4.3.1. Intel/McAfee
In the ICT sector, the Commission focuses more on whether a concentration would
harm the ability of the merged entity’s competitors to innovate, instead of the
merged entity itself. In the Intel/McAfee case,59 the Commission feared that
Intel could prevent endpoint security solutions from McAfee’s competitors from
56Christopher Cook, Sven Frisch and Vladimir Novak, ‘Recent Developments in EU
Merger Remedies’ (2015) 7 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 351–64.
57Liberty Global/Ziggo (Case COMP/M.7000).
58Cook, Frisch and Novak (n 57) 360.
59Intel/McAfee (Case COMP/M.5984) [2011] OJ C98/1.
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being compatible with Intel’s CPU’s60 and chipsets. The case was solved via the
following remedy: Intel promised not to stop other providers of security software
from operating on its chips or coming up with innovative solutions. In this way,
competition and an innovative environment are protected, but the beneﬁts of
tighter integration of chips with security software are also attained.61
4.3.2. ARM
A similar case is ARM.62 This ﬁrm supplied IP architecture for application pro-
cessors used in for example smartphones and tablets. It wanted to set up a joint
venture (JV) in order to develop hardware-based security solutions for e-mail
and mobile banking, inter alia. The Commission feared that, due to its strong pos-
ition, ARM could diminish the interoperability of this hardware extension with
software solutions competing with the JV, or refuse/delay the communication of
technical information to competitors. The remedy applied made sure that it
would not do so. The case Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere
seemed to cause fewer problems in the Commission’s view. It concerned a JV
for a mobile wallet platform to be set up by three out of four UK mobile
network operators. The Commission did not think it likely that competitors
would be foreclosed, and alternatives already existed.63 A similar conclusion
was reached in the Intel/Altera case. Altera made so-called ﬁeld-programmable
gate array (FPGA) chips that could speed up some tasks of Intel’s CPU’s, such
as recognizing images or search. The Commission wanted to know whether
Intel could foreclose Altera’s competitors by not licencing its proprietary technol-
ogies that connect the CPU to the FPGA. The conclusion was that there was a
useful alternative, namely a certain open standard interconnect technology –
and Intel had already licenced (or made offers to licence) the technology at
issue to FGPA competitors.64
4.3.3. Speciﬁcities of ICT markets
Some speciﬁc aspects of ICT markets have to be kept in mind.65 There can be
switching costs for consumers. These costs make it more difﬁcult for a new
60Central Processing Units (used in computers).
61Cook, Frisch and Novak (n 57). Commission, Competition Policy Brief, 2016-01, April
2016, ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf.
62ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto JV (Case COMP/M.6564) [2012] OJ C368/9.
63Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere JV (Case COMP/M.6314) [2013]
OJ C66/5.
64Intel/Altera (Case COMP/M.7688) [2015] OJ C408. Commission, Competition Policy
Brief, 2016-01, April 2016, ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_
en.pdf.
65Fatur (n 45), 218–19.
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company to win customers, but also more proﬁtable, since the new customer is
then (to a smaller or larger extent) “locked in”. When there is a radically new tech-
nology, this makes joint dominance less likely. Since there are typically high ﬁxed
costs, but low marginal costs, often only a few companies survive in these sectors,
due to ﬁerce competition in early phases.66
High market shares are not decisive, since they are often transitory. This can be
exempliﬁed by the Logica/CMG and HP/Compaq cases.67 The Commission can
estimate how successful products under development will affect the market. Poss-
ible competing products under development are also taken into consideration.68
Admittedly, the result after some time may be different in the “real world” – but
it is all that can be done at this point.
Network effects are taken into account as well – they are common in the ICT
sector.69
The Commission looks whether the expansion of smaller ﬁrms is hindered or if
their ability to compete is otherwise restricted by such effects.70 When the market
is already concentrated and the acquired company, although much smaller than the
acquirer, is an important competitor, the risk of consumer harm is high. It is rel-
evant whether a new ﬁrm on the market will probably be inﬂuential in the
future. The Commission looks whether new entrants have “essential” access to
R&D or IPRs.71
The previous lines of reasoning speciﬁcally apply to horizontal effects. When
there is a non-horizontal merger, other factors become relevant. A common
concern in the ICTsector involves two-level entry theory; the presence of a vertically
integrated ﬁrm can make it difﬁcult for a new ﬁrm to enter at only one level. The
Commission is primarily concerned when it is signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult to enter
at one level than at multiple levels. This is often the case when a non-vertically inte-
grated company’s component does not work (optimally) with a component produced
by the vertically integrated merged entity. Another danger is that a dominant ﬁrm can
often leverage its position to another market via a concentration.72
4.3.4. Google/DoubleClick
Conglomerate mergers usually entail lower risks for competition, because the pro-
ducts are not as closely connected. An example is the Google/DoubleClick
66Ibid 220.
67Logica/CMG (Case COMP/M.3014) [2003] OJ C10/8; HP/Compaq (Case COMP/
M.2609) [2002] OJ C39/23.
68Fatur (n 45) 224.
69Network effects mean that a service becomes more useful, the more people are making
use of it. For example, telephones or social media – the more people are using them, the
more people you can contact.
70Fatur (n 45) 224.
71Ibid 226–8.
72Ibid 229.
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merger.73 Google could use this merger to become the dominant intermediation plat-
form for online advertising. DoubleClick’s market power was however not proble-
matic, since there were strong rivals. Prices were thus kept lower, and customers
could easily switch to other suppliers (they frequently did so). The combined custo-
mer basis could enable the merged entity to improve its service by better targeting of
advertisements. However, the speciﬁc type of targeting at issue was contractually
prohibited. Moreover, multi-homing74 was common. The Commission did not
think it probable that AdSense would become dominant after the concentration.75
Competitors’ prices of ad serving would have to increase signiﬁcantly in order for
AdSense to gain a strong dominant position, which was very unlikely. So, vertical
integration can provide efﬁciencies that compensate for its negative consequences.76
4.3.5. Cisco/Tandberg, IMS Health/Cegedim
In Cisco/Tandberg,77 both companies operated on the market for videoconferen-
cing solutions. As a merger remedy, they agreed to divest their rights in the Tele-
presence Interoperability Protocol (TIP) to an independent body – this protocol
might become the industry standard. In this way, other manufacturers of videocon-
ferencing solutions could also participate in updates to the TIP protocol. For the
meantime, licencing commitments were made. Moreover, the companies pub-
lished a source code library and promised to implement TIP on a number of pro-
ducts and successor products.78
IMS Health/Cegedim79 needed a slightly different approach. The activities of
these companies were dependent upon each other. The software made by Cegedim
could only operate properly in combination with brick structure data (a system of
proprietary information which segments geographical areas into units for tracking
pharmaceutical sales). IMS Health was dominant in the market for this. It had to
sell off its primary market research business and promise to continue to
conclude (on a royalty-free basis) “Third Party Access Agreements” to its brick
structure.80
73Google/DoubleClick (Case COMP/M.4731) [2008] OJ C184/10. Since Google and Dou-
bleClick are not direct competitors (they sell complements), there could be vertical and/or
conglomerate effects.
74The use of services of multiple competing companies.
75Fatur (n 45), 234–5.
76Fatur (n 45). Damien Geradin and Monika Kuschewsky, ‘Competition Law and Personal
Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue’, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216088
accessed 1 October 2016; Andres V. Lerner, ‘The Role of Big Data in Online Platform Com-
petition’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780 accessed 1 October
2016.
77Cisco/Tandberg (Case COMP/M.5669).
78Hoehn and Lewis (n 9).
79IMS Health/Cegedim (Case COMP/M.7337) [2014] OJ C57/1.
80Cook, Frisch and Novak (n 57) 361.
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4.4. Cases in the pharmaceutical sector
4.4.1. Divestiture remedies
In other sectors, the analysis and explanation of competition and innovation effects
has improved as well. The Commission states that a horizontal merger can hinder
innovation, because some products which are being improved, or still under devel-
opment, will not enter the market anymore. It is especially concerned with these
problems in the pharmaceutical and medical equipment sectors, given the poten-
tially large effects on the health and life of persons. The Medtronic/Covidien
merger, for example, was conditionally approved. Medtronic was the leading
ﬁrm on the market for drug-coated balloons to treat vascular diseases, and Covi-
dien had almost completed developing an effective competing treatment (called
Stellarex). According to the Commission, the transaction could have caused an
important rival ﬁrm to leave the market. That is why it only cleared the merger
after Medtronic agreed to sell off the Stellarex business.81 The Novartis/GSK
case was similar. The Commission identiﬁed that Novartis would have in all like-
lihood stopped developing two innovative drugs, because it would acquire drugs
with the same working mechanism from GSK – which would have resulted in
duplicate clinical programmes. A divestiture remedy was put in place.82
A similar case is Pﬁzer/Hospira,83 a concentration which was also con-
ditionally approved. It concerned a biosimilar drug for treating certain auto-
immune diseases. Biosimilars have the same therapeutical mechanism as
original patented biological pharmaceuticals, but they are not exact copies,
unlike generics. They are much cheaper to produce, which can ease access to
medicines for patients and/or reduce burdens on public healthcare systems. The
Commission feared that Pﬁzer would have delayed or stopped the development
of the biosimilar inﬂiximab, in order to focus on Hospira’s similar product. Or,
Pﬁzer would have returned Hospira’s product to its co-developer Celltrion.
Again, a divestiture remedy was put in place.84
4.4.2. Interoperability remedies
The Siemens/Drägerwerk merger85 raised concerns on the markets for ventilators
and anaesthesia equipment. This is not a pharmaceutical case, but it is interesting
to take it into account, given the fact that it concerns medical equipment and health
81Medtronic/Covidien (Case COMP/M.7326) [2015] OJ C82/1.
82Novartis/GSK (Case COMP/M.7275) [2015] OJ C95/14. Commission, Competition
Policy Brief, 2016-01, April 2016, ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/
2016_001_en.pdf.
83Pﬁzer/Hospira (Case COMP/M.7559) [2016] OJ C324/2.
84Commission, Competition Policy Brief, 2016-01, April 2016, ec.europa.eu/competition/
publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf.
85Siemens/Drägerwerk (Case COMP/M.2861) Commission Decision 2003/777/EC [2003]
OJ L291/1.
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considerations could thus play a role. The merged entity would gain a very high
market share in the market for anaesthesia delivery equipment; it could decide
not to provide necessary information for competing monitors to interoperate
with those created by Siemens. To resolve these concerns, Siemens agreed to
divest Siemens Life Support Systems; the purchaser would then compete with
the merged entity. It also committed to provide interoperability information on a
royalty-free basis, to allow rival products to communicate with these and other rel-
evant products manufactured by Siemens.86
As described by Hoehn and Lewis, the companies in the cases described above
might have given away interoperability information for free because this was stan-
dard industry practice. Before the merger of Siemens and Drägerwerk, and GE and
Instrumentarium, healthcare technology companies already showed this practice,
in order for their products to be widely used.87 According to Lundqvist:
Patent law and copyright law could be of importance in upholding competition by
supplement and by diversity. Patent rights force ﬁrms to innovate and innovate
around, while competition law should still prevent mergers and joint ventures that
concentrate on the innovation process. That would be the formula for creating inno-
vation while upholding the goals of competition88
In his view, R&D-intensive ﬁrms should be able to exit long-term agreements with
large ﬁrms when it can be proven that these large ﬁrms are trying to buy innovative
ﬁrms out of the market, to prevent a radically innovative product from being intro-
duced, or show similar behaviour. When there is a joint R&D venture or merger, it
would then have to be evaluated whether speciﬁc research lines will not be stopped
or severely hindered.89 It is again important to be careful when applying these
insights, as the large ﬁrms still need incentives to invest and innovate as well.
The Commission thus seems able to take into account differences between
sectors when assessing the innovation effects of a concentration.
5. Analysis
5.1. Criticism and scope for improvement of the Commission’s practice
5.1.1. Differentiation between types of markets
In recent years, the Commission seems to have improved its analysis of the inno-
vation effects of mergers. It has recognised that innovation can lead to an increase
in market power, and even result in new markets. However, the fact that a market is
rapidly developing can also make it more difﬁcult to assess whether a merger will
create a dominant position, and if so, whether this is problematic. After all, a new
86Hoehn and Lewis (n 9) 15.
87Ibid 29.
88Björn Lundqvist, Joint Research and Development under US Antitrust and EU Compe-
tition Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 253.
89Lundqvist (n 91).
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product or a signiﬁcant improvement of a product, by for example a new entrant,
can mean that even a ﬁrm with a very high market share might not be dominant.
Looking at these ﬁgures only, is thus likely to be misleading. It is important that
the Commission becomes even more aware of the different types of situations that
innovative markets can be in. Is the market already concentrated, how likely is it
that there will be a new entrant, is there a product under development for which
there is currently no substitute?90 This is often difﬁcult to assess, so the Commis-
sion would be well-advised to make even more use of recent economic insights.
After all, if an incorrect economic analysis is applied, this is likely to lead to
decisions that hamper innovation.
5.1.2. Intrusive remedies
Even quite recently, the Commission has received criticism on its merger control
practice,91 but these remarks do not seem to be entirely valid anymore. Its approach
in the beginning, easily ﬁnding that competition is harmed, seems to have arisen out
of necessity. After all, a decision has to be taken in each case and the risk of both
Type I and Type II errors is very high. The Commission seems to mind Type II
errors more. Most of the time, errors can only be discovered with the beneﬁt of hind-
sight. This is largely still true, the Commission often attaches very strict conditions
before clearing a concentration, but it now seems to better explain the reasons for
this. Economic research is pressing further as well and will lead to evenmore knowl-
edge on how innovative markets develop. So, we can be hopeful that the Commis-
sion’s analysis will further improve.
We see that the Commission is taking an activist position, not afraid to require
quite intrusive remedies. Criticism that it would go too far in doing this, is
especially heard in the ICT sector. IPRs in this sector are often essential for
other companies to use or build further upon, and one product can contain
many patents.92 So, it can lead to anti-competitive foreclosure when a (merged)
ﬁrm with a large market share can freely decide not to licence this IP. Indeed,
the Commission often assumes that a merged ﬁrm has to give competitors
access to essential technology as well. Merger commitments in these sectors
often entail that certain information has to be licenced.
5.2. Improved tests in the Commission’s practice
5.2.1. Incentives to innovate
The question has arisen whether this happens too often. Competitors can now
often “free ride” on investments made by a merged ﬁrm without having to inno-
vate themselves. This surely is a valid argument. However, access to certain
90Laskowska (n 19).
91See, for example, ibid.
92Lemley (n 5).
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information can enable a new ﬁrm to enter a market, leading to more competition.
The most important examples of this can be seen in network industries such as
telecom. The fact that only few ﬁrms own a network, can easily lead to abuse
of a dominant position. This is why the Commission often obliges companies to
grant rivals access to these assets. Previously, there was much concern that this
practice would diminish incentives to innovate for the companies owning the
network. However, nowadays the Commission’s approach has improved: compa-
nies buying access to a network now have more incentives to make optimal use of
it as well.93
5.2.2. Would information have been made public anyway?
It is true that obligations to give access to assets can diminish incentives to inno-
vate. However, in various cases, information has or would have been made pub-
licly available anyway, in order to ease market access for new technologies.94 We
can see this in the ICT sector when there are open source alternatives to a certain
technology, but also in medical sectors, where information is shared freely in order
to let products be used widely.
5.2.3. Differences between sectors
For the assessment of the effects of a merger, it makes a difference in which sector
it takes place. This is the case because very different interests are at stake. More-
over, different types of innovation can be distinguished. In the ICT sector, access
to IPRs is often needed for follow-on innovation, whereas in the pharmaceutical
sector this is mostly not possible, since every product stands on its own.95
Especially in the medical sectors, the Commission seems to be afraid that
certain research lines will be stopped that could have led to a new or better
product. In this sector, it thus seems to focus on maintaining diversity between
ﬁrms and their activities.96 Outside the medical sectors, it should, however,
become even more aware of the possibilities and incentives for ﬁrms to innovate
even without licencing obligations and similar measures. In this way, it will take
even more proportionate measures.
5.2.4. More proportionate remedies
Remedies that are offered are frequently very precise, for example in pharma-
ceutical cases, and the Liberty Global/Ziggo, Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica
93Cook, Frisch and Novak (n 57).
94Hoehn and Lewis (n 9).
95Lemley (n 5).
96Cf. Mooij and Rusu (n 1).
European Competition Journal 317
Ireland and Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus cases. The Commission now seems to
better understand when a measure is proportionate or not. In the pharmaceutical
cases, one often sees divestiture remedies that are very intrusive – but this is under-
standable, given the interests at stake. The Commission thus seems able to differ-
entiate between various sectors and their speciﬁcities.
6. Conclusion
6.1. Sufﬁcient competition after a merger?
Mergers in innovative markets are often difﬁcult to assess because the structure of
a market can change quickly, and it is mostly not possible to tell exactly what the
next innovative step will be. In recent years, the Commission has developed a
more sound methodology for assessing the effects of mergers in these markets.
The Commission tries to assess the extent of market power that the ﬁrm will
have after the merger. Are the merging ﬁrms the most innovative ones, are they
likely to still face sufﬁcient competition?97
6.2. The application of remedies in practice
6.2.1. Access to networks – an improved approach
In network sectors such as telecom, merging ﬁrms often commit to give access to
the network to new companies, in order for them to be able to access the market.
The Commission’s approach here is more reﬁned than in earlier years; it tries to
confer responsibilities upon the acquirers of access as well.98 However, it
remains questionable whether the current approach gives each party the most
incentives to invest and innovate (both merged entities owning a network and
new entrants). The remedies applied are more proportionate than before, though.
6.2.2. Access to information – the need for a balanced approach
Also in other sectors, such as ICT, such a strict approach can be seen. Remedies
often entail that access to information, even if protected by IPRs, has to be
given in order to enable a rival to effectively compete. The Commission seems
to do this very often when follow-on innovation is at stake – thereby applying
Lemley’s advice to grant access to information in the ICT sector where follow-
on innovation is frequent.99 Access to information can thus lead to a new or
improved product of a competitor – and more effective competition. However,
as has been extensively debated, the practice might also reduce incentives to
invest and innovate for a merged ﬁrm. The Commission should thus look carefully
97Laskowska (n 19).
98Cook, Frisch and Novak (n 57).
99Lemley (n 5).
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whether such measures are indeed necessary to achieve their goals. There are signs
that the Commission is indeed starting to analyse these cases more carefully. For
example, it also takes into account whether there are open source alternatives
available.100 It is then not necessary to restrict the dominant ﬁrm’s contract
freedom, since competitors can innovate without having access to the merged
ﬁrm’s technology.
6.2.3. Pharmaceutical markets – often divestiture is necessary
In the pharmaceutical sector, divestiture of a product business is often necessary.
Again, the Commission seems to fear Type II errors more than Type I errors. In this
sector, it is mostly not possible to conduct follow-on innovation. Therefore, access
to information is less frequently needed in this sector, the Commission follows this
insight described by Lemley.101 So, a new ﬁrm will have to come up with a com-
pletely new product. This type of competition is something the Commission aims
for, because it allows for new medicines to be found the quickest.102 Therefore, its
approach is understandable.
6.3. Conclusion: a differentiated approach, but still room for improvement
We can thus see that the Commission is able to differentiate between various
sectors, but in each sector, it is trying to keep much discretion. This has remained
so over the course of the years, but economic developments have pressed further,
allowing the Commission to apply more proportionate measures. Nevertheless,
there is still scope for improvement.
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